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Abstract Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest coun-
tries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing
countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to
investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of
property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s ‘‘contract intensive money’’ (CIM),
conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance
in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant
role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline.
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1 Introduction
How has Argentina, a country which occupied a position among the ten richest
countries in the world in terms of income per capita in the early twentieth century,
slipped to its current place in the ranking, closer to that of Turkey than to Western
Europe?
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Argentina began to lose ground when compared with Australia and Canada,
countries whose development was also largely due to the exploitation of natural
resources and the exports of primary goods, in the late nineteenth century.1
However, it was not until the second half of the twentieth century, and in particular
during its last quarter, that Argentina fell behind definitively.2 Why did Argentine
drop back? Why was Argentina not able to catch up with Australia and Canada
during the twentieth century? These are questions that still await a definitive answer.
Human and physical capital accumulation remains the key variable for growth
(Temple 1999) and its increase depends, ultimately, on the existence of a set of
incentives provided by institutions (North 1990, p. 134). Weak capital accumula-
tion, largely attributed to poor institutional quality, has been proposed as a main
force in Argentina’s falling behind (Taylor 1992, 1998b). In this paper we
investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of
property rights conditioned broad capital accumulation and, consequently, long-run
economic performance in Argentina.
Clague et al. (1999) have suggested a way of measuring compliance with
contracts and the security of property rights, ‘‘contract intensive money’’ (CIM),
which is defined as the percentage of deposits in money supply (M2).3 The idea
behind this indicator is that financial assets are held in ways that depend on the
definition of property rights. When economic agents operate in a stable context, in
which property rights are well defined and guaranteed, it is not risky to keep assets
in deposit accounts and, consequently, cash becomes a less attractive option.
Therefore the proportion of deposits in the money supply will tend to increase.
Ceteris paribus, better contract enforcement will encourage investment and, hence,
lead to a higher rate of growth. The opposite situation would pertain in a poorly
defined institutional framework. A caveat is, nonetheless, necessary, as already
pointed by Clague et al. (1999). In a context of high inflation CIM becomes a
defective measure of contract enforcement and, hence, weakens its association/
connection with capital accumulation and, thus, economic growth.
The long-run association between secure contract and property rights, as
measured by CIM, broad capital accumulation, and growth in Argentina is
investigated with a system of structural equations. Our results suggest that, until the
1960s, poor contract enforcement played a major role in Argentina’s unique
historical experience of economic decline. Later, between the early 1970s and
1990s, hyperinflation reduced CIMs ability to capture the compliance of contracts.
Moreover, it appeared that, it was not just capital accumulation but mainly
1 In other words, before the dates for the beginning of Argentina’s retardation (the First World War, the
Great Depression and the post-World War II era) suggested, upto now, by economic historians. Cf. Corte´s
Conde (1997), Di Tella and Zymelman (1967), Dı´az Alejandro (1970), Ferrer (1996), Taylor (1992, 1994,
1998b). These results derive from the study of the relative series of GDP per capita between 1875 and
1990 using the unit root method and structural breaks. Cf. Sanz-Villarroya (2004, 2005).
2 See Sanz-Villarroya (2005) and Kydland and Zarazaga (2002).
3 How to measure the connections between institutions, ‘‘a construct of the human mind’’, and
investment and growth represents a major challenge. As North, Institutions, p. 107 writes, ‘‘We cannot
see, feel, touch, or even measure institutions; they are constructs of the human mind’’. Cf. Knack and
Keefer (1995), for an attempt to prove this relationship empirically.
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efficiency gains what conditioned Argentina’s performance in the late twentieth
century (Kydland and Zarazaga 2002).
In the rest of the paper we survey major interpretations of the origins of
Argentina’s comparative retardation and find that poor institutional quality has been
identified as a deterrent for capital accumulation that, in turn, hampered economic
growth (Sect. 2). We describe, then, the long-run evolution of CIM in Argentina
(Sect. 3); investigate the extent to which CIM conditioned physical and human
capital accumulation, hence, growth (Sect. 4) and, lastly, explore how different
Argentina’s performance might have been if the country’s security of contracts and
property rights, as proxied by CIM, had been closer to those of Australia and
Canada (Sect. 5).
2 When and why did Argentina begin to decline?
Argentina, Australia, and Canada are often compared as areas of European
settlement, exporters of primary goods under British influence and as case studies
that followed similar paths between the end of the nineteenth and the mid-twentieth
century. All three were thinly populated, blessed with supplies of natural resources
which gave them a privileged position in the international economy despite the fact
that they were geographically distant from centers of economic activity (Gallo 1983;
Duncan and Fogarty 1984; Platt and Di Tella 1986).
Figure 1 presents Argentina’s performance relative to Australia and Canada, in
terms of product per person (expressed as its difference in natural logarithms). We
have used purchasing power parity adjusted GDP per capita expressed in 1913 US
relative prices for the period 1875–1939 and 1980 US relative prices for the period
1940–2001.4 Argentina converged towards Australian and Canadian levels but at
the turn of the century began to stagnate and decline set in (although occasionally
drawing level with Canada until 1930s). A significant, negative structural break took
place in 1974 after which Argentina fell further and further behind (Sanz-Villarroya
2005).
A plurality of mostly untested explanations has been proposed for these trends.
According to Di Tella and Zymelman (1967), the definitive closing of the frontier
was a major difference between Argentina and the other areas of new settlement as
no compensatory alternatives emerged. Platt and Di Tella (1985) pointed to the
variations in political traditions and the origins of immigrants as the key differential
factors while Dı´az Alejandro (1985) suggested that a restrictive immigration policy,
as followed by Australia, might have encouraged the relative scarcity of labor and
4 The levels of real product per person for 1913 and 1980 are taken from Prados de la Escosura (2000).
The volume indices used to project these benchmarks across the entire period are taken from Maddison
(2003), except for the period 1875–1935 in Argentina, for which we used Corte´s Conde’s GDP
reconstruction (1997). This procedure attempts to mitigate the index number problem caused by using
real product per capita series expressed in relative prices of a distant benchmark year. This is the case
with Maddison’s World Economy figures in 1990 dollars, which are normally used in this type of
comparison. Nevertheless, the use of Maddison’s data does not significantly change the results (Sanz-
Villarroya 2005).
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increased the productivity of labor. Associated to high immigration is the relatively
high dependency rate from which Taylor (1992) infers lower savings rates than in
Australia and Canada. In fact, much of the capital entering the country did so as a
reaction to such low savings rates (Taylor and Williamson 1994).5
Institutions have been recurrently blamed for Argentina’s retardation.6 For
example, Duncan and Fogarty (1984) argued that the contrast between the stable,
flexible government of Australia and the bad government of Argentina made for the
crucial differences. In Solberg’s (1987) influential view, Canadian policy of
distributing land among a large number of small farmers was more favorable for
growth than the Argentinean allocation which resulted in a small number of
landowners with large plots of land and, consequently, a higher wealth inequality.7
The erosion of the rule of law since the 1930s, has been pointed out, is at the roots of
Argentina’s slide from the core to the periphery (Alston and Gallo 2003, 2006;
Spiller and Tommasi 2007). Furthermore, from 30s onwards, capital accumulation
was hampered by relatively high prices of (mostly imported) capital goods, which
was the result of an industrial policy of import substitution (Taylor 1994, 1998a).
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Fig. 1 Argentina’s relative GDP per head, 1875–2001 (differences in logs)
5 In fact, between 1900 and 1929, Argentina’s savings rate was around 10% lower than that of Australia
and Canada and her dependency rate was 5% higher (Taylor 1992, pp. 922–925). Taylor estimated that, in
the long term, around two-thirds of the difference between the savings rates in Argentina and Australia
was due to the disparity in their dependency rates.
6 Corte´s Conde (1998b) and Gerchunoff and Fajgelbaum (2006) provide interpretations of Argentine’s
economic performance in the long-run with special emphasis on the role of institutions.
7 However, an open land market existed in Argentina where many more immigrants than generally
believed became farmers (Sa´nchez-Alonso 2000). Gallo (1983), argued that lack of capital and
agricultural knowledge made advantageous for immigrants to become tenant farmers. Cf. Adelman
(1994), for a qualified assessment of Solberg’s views. Also, Ferns et al. (1993).
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Multiple exchange rates, black markets for foreign currencies, and high customs
tariffs induced high relative prices of capital goods (Taylor 1998b; Collins and
Williamson 2001) that led to lower capital intensity and reduced productivity
growth. After the dramatic decline initiated in 1974 and upto the early 1990s
protectionism and high interest rates increased the cost of capital that brought about
a reduction in the capital–labor ratio and set in a reallocation of labor towards
services (Hopenhayn and Neumeyer 2003).
Thus, poorly defined institutions appear to have constrained capital accumulation
and, hence, hindered development in Argentina but establishing how much posits a
real challenge. To begin with, quantifying the role of institutions represents a major
difficulty. Then, we need to test the extent to which the institutional framework
conditions broad capital accumulation and, consequently, economic growth.
In an attempt to define the institutional framework and measure its influence,
Clague et al. (1999) proposed an indicator known as CIM which designates the
money kept in deposits as a proportion of the money supply:
CIM ¼ M2  Cð Þ=M2 ð1Þ
where C is currency outside banks and M2 is the money supply including current
and term deposits.
The rationale that lies beneath this indicator is that when economic agents trust
that contracts will be respected and do operate in an environment considered to be
safe, they hold a larger proportion of their money as deposits, so the CIM indicator
tends to increase. CIM measures the proportion of transactions that rely on third-
party enforcement and, hence, provides an indicator of the security of property
rights.8 If contracts are enforced, a favorable atmosphere for investment is created
and the rate of capital formation tends to rise, leading to economic growth.9 In the
case of Argentina, the CIM measure, closely associated to economic freedom,
political stability, financial development, and inequality, can be interpreted as an
indicator of contract enforcement. In Appendix 1 we provide a rigorous econometric
testing of the extent to which CIM constitutes a proxy for the security of contracts
and property rights.10
8 Clague et al. (1999, p. 204), use PCA to show that a group of institutional indicators which includes
measures of political and civil freedom, the degree of property rights’ definition, and of the frequency of
revolutions and coups d’e´tat, has a heavier load in factor 1, while financial development variables appear
in factor 2. They, hence, conclude that CIM is mainly a measure of property rights enforcement. Cf. Sylla
and Rousseau (2003), for the long-run connections between financial development and growth.
9 CIM would weaken as a measure of institutional quality if it were just a measure of savings, so the
higher the interest rate, the larger the proportion of the money supply in deposits, and it would not be
surprising to find an association between CIM and the rate of investment. We found, however, that CIM is
a good predictor of the different components of capital formation that do not necessarily have a high
correlation with savings rates and, hence, rejected this scenario for the case of Argentina. To do so, we
run regressions for Eq. 2 of Table 2 with farm investment, non-farm investment and government
investment instead of total investment rates and the results were highly coincidental with positive and
statistically significant associations between CIM and each component of total investment. Data for
investment components comes from Della Paolera et al. (2003).
10 It should be kept in mind, however, that stable institutions can be impediments for growth when under
their rule risk taking is constraint and property rights are not enforced (Bueno de Mesquita and Root
(2000, p. 7).
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3 Trends in CIM
Distinctive phases or long swings can be established in the evolution of CIM using
the deviations from a Hodrick–Prescott trend (Fig. 2). An early period of long-
term stability during the late nineteenth century (1863–1891) gave way to a rising
trend in the early twentieth century that peaked by 1921. The third phase or long-
swing interval, 1922–1960, is one of the long-run decline that started from high
levels, relatively stable upto 1931, declined smoothly, first, until 1942, keeping
CIM levels above the pre-World War I level up to 1942, and, then, sharply until
1960. The fourth long-swing interval, 1961–1979, corresponds to a recovery of the
pre-World War II levels. In the fifth interval, 1980–2003, stability presided over
1974–1988 followed by a sharp decline in 1989. A recovery that peaked in 2001
followed by a sharp contraction characterized the last period. It is worth stressing
that the significance of CIM as a measure of contract enforcement and security of
property is seriously weakened by high inflation.11 Argentina suffered inflationary
episodes throughout the second half of the twentieth century and hyperinflation set
in between 1971 and 1992. So our measurement of the enforceability of contracts
for the late twentieth century is challenged and should be taken with a grain of salt.
The late nineteenth century years were of high political stability and formal
democratic institutions that upto 1912 concealed authoritarian Governmental
practices. Male universal suffrage was effective since 1853 but had been severely
constrained by the requirement of Argentinean citizenship at a time of massive
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Fig. 2 The evolution of CIM in Argentina, 1863–2003
11 As Clague et al. (1999, p. 205) stress, ‘‘inflation reduces the value of money, raises nominal interest
rates, and therefore provides an incentive to shift money from currency and noninterest-bearing accounts
into interest-paying time deposits or into foreign currency accounts. This increases CIM’’.
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immigration. Electoral fraud and lack of political competition showed in the low
electoral turnout (Colomer 2004). Nonetheless, political stability and the protection
of property rights favored economic progress. CIM expansion was interrupted by
cyclical downturns, the most severe one during the Baring crisis. The Baring crisis
in the 1890s exposed the conflict between a high fiscal deficit, the impossibility of
maintaining a constant exchange rate and a poorly regulated banking system (Della
Paolera and Taylor 2001). The lack of co-ordination between monetary and fiscal
policy caused the crisis which led to the collapse of the banking system and, thus, to
a marked decrease in CIM.12
The turn of the century signaled the beginning of a period of economic recovery
and political stability which lasted until the First World War and the expansion of
CIM peaked in 1921.
Even if a declining trend in CIM initiates in 1922, the highest historical levels of
CIM coincide with the period delimited between 1912, when compulsory universal
vote for men over 18 years and secret ballot was introduced (Colomer 2004), and
the 1930 coup d’etat, in which Argentina enjoyed a transition to an open democracy,
an independent judiciary, and a clearer separation of powers (Alston and Gallo
2006). Economic policies maintained orthodoxy until the 1930s crisis. Free trade
policy continued virtually unaltered.13 Moreover, between 1890 and 1929 Argentina
was anchored to the currency board (Caja de Conversio´n) with a mission to
guarantee the currency’s value abroad.14
CIM decreased slowly in the years following 1931, although its value remained
high for another decade. The beginning of CIM’s deterioration coincided with the
erosion of judiciary’s independence as the 1930 coup d’etat was condoned by the
Supreme Court and followed by electoral fraud which paved the way for populism
and for a departure from a democratic system with checks and balances.15 The fact
that the decline in CIM was slow might be associated with changes in
macroeconomic policy and with the evolution in the financial development. The
public sector implemented a policy of balanced budget after the Depression, which
required new sources of income and reductions in spending.16 Nevertheless, the
change in trade policy would also play its part in the opposite direction.17 Exchange
12 According to Della Paolera and Taylor (2001, p. 11), the crisis showed initially the symptoms of a
traditional banking crisis, that is an increase in the amount of cash in the hands of the public, an increase
in the banks’ reserves-deposits ratio and the elimination of some financial institutions, which meant the
destruction of deposits.
13 In O’Connell’s (1986, p. 91) view, there were few changes in trade policy, while the rest of the world
returned to protectionism. During 1920s Argentina continued its free trade policy as a producer of staple
goods. The main change was a tariff increase in 1923 from 25 to 60% of the official ‘aforo’ values. Cf. Di
Tella (1986, pp. 122–123).
14 The return to the gold standard took place in 1899 and, despite leaving it again in 1900, 1914, and
1929, the monetary authorities continued to act within its rules (Della Paolera and Taylor 1999).
15 Cf. Iaryczower et al. (2002) and Alston and Gallo (2006). Alston and Gallo emphasize the gap between
the conservatives’ good economic policies and political short-sightedness during the 1930s.
16 According to Della Paolera and Taylor (1999), the effects of the fiscal decisions taken could have led
to contraction until 1935 and it cannot be said that a New Deal type policy was practiced.
17 For Di Tella, the 1930 crisis was the watershed between free trade and protection in Argentina,
although the main change came after the Second World War (Di Tella 1986, p. 128).
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controls were introduced and the peso was significantly devalued more than once,
after the devaluation of the pound in 1931. Quantitative restrictions on imports were
also introduced at this time (Alhadeff 1986, p. 104). There inward-looking policies
laid the foundations for corporatist policies and populism (Berensztein and Spector
2003, p. 363).
From 1943 onwards, the arrival of military to power and specially the Pero´n’s
arrival to power in 1946 and his consecutive terms of office coincide with a fall of
CIM to levels similar to those of the last decade of the nineteenth century. The
electoral fraud of the 1930s which led to a popular distrust in the rule of law help to
explain Juan Domingo Pero´n’s landslide victory following the introduction of male
and female universal suffrage in Argentina (Alston and Gallo 2006; Colomer 2004).
The impeachment of the Supreme Court, as it represented an obstacle to populist
policies, and the introduction of the 1949 Constitution destroyed the separation of
powers and implied that property rights were no longer protected through the rule of
law (Iaryczower et al. 2002; Alston and Gallo 2006). Early Peronism was a period
of macroeconomic shocks during which a strategy of import substitution industri-
alization was put into practice. Bilateral trade, exchange control, and multiple
exchange rates were its most important characteristics (Rock 1987). The increase in
the role of government reflected in the increase in state-owned property,
interventionism (including control of rents and prices), and higher levels of public
spending (Di Tella and Dornbusch 1989). Pero´n’s expansive macroeconomic policy,
which aimed at the redistribution of wealth and the increase of spending to finance
populist policies, led to inflation. Argentina’s inability to return to the rule of law
translated into political and economic volatility (high inflation and drastic
devaluations) during the decades that followed Pero´n’s arrival to power (Alston
and Gallo 2006).18
The recovery of CIM in the 1960s coincided with a policy change which included
an attempt to face the challenges of inflation, public deficit and foreign debt, as well
opening up the economy.19
Pero´n’s second term of office was characterized by an expansive monetary
policy, which resulted in an uncontrolled rise in the level of inflation.20
Hyperinflation, as rightly pointed by Clague at al. (1999), renders CIM useless as
a measure of contract enforceability and this explains its rise despite the insecurity
of property right faced by economic agents. In fact, hyperinflation and negative real
interest rates impeded the financial reform of 1977 to achieve more than a short-
18 Institutional instability reveals itself in the shortening of length of Supreme Court justices’ tenure
(Iaryczower et al. 2002).
19 There were attempts to create an atmosphere which was favorable to private capital by the adoption of
measures to stabilize and liberalize the economy under Frondizi’s presidency and following an agreement
with the IMF. Exchange rates were unified and many controls, both internal and external, were lifted.
Under the Onganı´a dictatorship (1966–1970), a stabilization plan was introduced based on a strict fiscal
policy and salary increases which were limited to the previous year’s rate of inflation. Exchange controls
were also withdrawn at the same time (Di Tella and Dornbusch 1989, pp. 109, 202).
20 Inflation reached 900% between 1975 and 1976. Cf. Di Tella and Dornbusch (1989).
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lived success, interrupted by the 1980 crisis.21 This situation was made worse by the
flight of capital, large fiscal and external deficits and, especially, by an enormous
foreign debt which would reach record levels in 1982, the year of The Falklands’
War (Gerchunoff and Llach 1998, p. 375). In this context of hyperinflation,
inequality in income distribution increased (Alvaredo 2006). Attempts to control the
hyperinflation and carry out fiscal reform in 1983 and the following years resulted in
another failure. This situation would only recover over the 1990s when the Menem
government brought the hyperinflation under control, established a fixed rate of
exchange and introduced deregulation.
4 CIM, capital accumulation, and growth
Once the CIM measure is built and its main trends established, the challenge is to
quantify the extent to which it conditioned capital accumulation and, subsequently,
economic performance. To provide a response to this question we use a structural
growth model based on a system of simultaneous equations designed to avoid
problems of endogeneity.
Our starting point is a conventional equation in which the level of real product
per head is dependent on GDP per capita in the previous period, on the rate of
change of the economically active population (EAP) (as an indicator of the growth
of labor), on the average enrollment rate in primary and secondary education (to
represent the growth of human capital), on the average rate of investment (as an
approximate measure of the growth of physical capital) and, finally, on the rate of
variation of the exports ratio to GDP (to indicate how openness changed over
time).22
We have attempted to endogenize each explanatory variable with supplementary
equations (Fig. 3).23 For example, the investment rate, one of our main variables, is
considered as endogenous in Eq. 2 (Table 2) and its behavior is specified as
dependent on the real interest rate, the relative price of capital goods, per capita
GDP growth (lagged one period), the variation in the dependency rate and, finally,
on CIM. Moreover, we investigate how much does CIM impinge on other variables
which are considered endogenous too, such as the EAP variation, education
enrollment, and the change in openness.
In the estimation we have employed the seemingly unrelated regression method
(SUR) that solves the problem of contemporary correlation between the equations’
residuals. The average values of the variables and their standard deviations are
shown in Table 1. The econometric results are presented in Table 2. All variables
21 The Central Bank had to take control of 60 institutions in this year (Cf. Gerchunoff and Llach 1998,
pp. 358–360).
22 We have followed Mankiw et al. (1992), approximation in which the level of GDP, instead of its rate
of growth, is used as the explanatory variable to test the Solow model. In the Solow model the rate of
saving and population growth are considered exogenous and they determine the steady-state level of
income per capita.
23 Here we depart from Clague et al. (1999) who run single cross section growth regressions without
attempting to endogeneize the independent variables of their growth equation.
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have the expected sign and level of significance. The level of real GDP per head is
directly and significantly related to investment and schooling rates and also (though
not significantly) to the rate of variation of the EAP. A standard deviation increase
in the rate of investment would represent, two periods later, a rise of 1.7% in per
capita GDP; the same increase in the rate of primary and secondary enrollment, six
-4
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0
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1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
CIM Investment
Fig. 3 CIM and the investment rate, 1875–2000 (normalized)
Table 1 Variables in the models: average and standard deviation
Variables Average (standard deviation)
Per head GDP level 8.322 (0.544)
Per capita GDP growth 0.013 (0.072)
Initial GDP per capita (in logs) 8.431 (0.410)
Economically active population growth 0.022 (0.019)
Primary and secondary enrollment(in logs) -0.835 (0.457)
Investment rate (in logs) -1.976 (0.441)
Real interest rate 0.061 (0.052)
Dependency rate (rate of variation) 0.022 (0.037)
Relative price of capital goods (in logs) -0.259 (0.246)
CIM (in logs) -0.337 (0.141)
RIEF -0.108 (1.045)
Openness (rate of variation) -0.003 (0.151)
Financial depth (M2/GDP) (in logs) -1.101 (0.378)
Terms of trade rate of variation 0.011 (0.106)
Supreme Court justices’ length of tenure (logs) 1.556 (0.690)
INEQ (inequality) (logs) -0.160 (0.295)
Sources: Appendix
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periods later, would raise per capita GDP by 3.8%. From these results we can infer
that investment in physical and in human capital lies beneath the evolution of the
GDP per head in Argentina. Lastly, an increase of standard deviation in the rate of
variation of openness would induce a rise of 1.2% in the level of income per capita.
It is worth highlighting that the explanatory variables of the level of per capita
GDP are influenced by CIM. For example, from Eq. 2 (Table 2) we can conclude
that the lower the real interest rate and the relative price of investment goods (in
terms of consumer goods), the higher the proportion of GDP dedicated to capital
formation in a previous period, while the larger the increase in CIM, the higher the
investment rate. In other words, if the real interest rate and the relative price of
capital goods decrease by one standard deviation, the rate of investment would rise
by 3.3 and 5.8%, respectively.24 In turn, one standard deviation increase in the level
of CIM five periods earlier would raise the rate of investment by 2.6%. Thus, the
improvement in contract enforcement, captured by CIM levels, appears as a major
determinant of capital formation in Argentina.
Moreover, these results lend support to the view that attributes the low capital
accumulation to a high dependency rate in the ‘age of mass migration’ and to high
relative prices of capital goods since the central decades of the twentieth century.25
A standard deviation increase in the variation of the dependency rate means a
decrease in the rate of investment of about 2.4%. Additionally, the level of
education enrollment, one of the main variables affecting the level of the GDP per
head, would increase of about 1.3% as a consequence of an increase of a standard
deviation in CIM. It is also worth mentioning that the more open the economy and
the more developed its financial system, the lower the price of capital goods.
All in all, the results of the estimated system of equations suggest that, in
Argentina, contract enforcement and the security of property rights, as measured by
CIM, would lead to higher rates of human and physical capital accumulation and,
thus, in higher per capita GDP.
5 Concluding remarks: a counterfactual proposition
So far we have analyzed the causes of Argentina’s long-run decline using a
structural model which incorporates contract enforcement in the form of the CIM
indicator. Our results show that poor compliance with contracts and lack of security
in property rights hindered investment in broad capital and, consequently, economic
performance (Fig. 4).
A comparison of CIM levels with those of Australia and Canada suggests that
economic agents had less confidence in the compliance of contracts in Argentina
(Fig. 4). In fact, the average value of CIM for Argentina is 0.70 over 1863–2001,
compared with an average of 0.90 and 0.84 for Australia and Canada, respectively.
24 Our results do not support the view that maintains that the relative price of capital goods did not have a
clear effect on the demand for investment, as the government could influence it via monetary policy and
public investment (Dı´az Alejandro 1965, p. 25).
25 Taylor (1994, 1998a). It is worth mentioning that the fact that our results confirm previous ones
obtained using independent methods reinforces the robustness of our model.
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This lower value corresponds to a lower share of investment in GDP, 15.1% for
Argentina, compared with 20.8 for Australia, and 19.4% for Canada (averages
computed for 1885–1998, 1861–2001, and 1870–2001, respectively).
What would have happened if property rights had been better defined and
contracts better enforced in Argentina? Would Argentina have caught up with
Australia and Canada in terms of material welfare? To provide an answer, we
propose a counterfactual exercise which illustrates the contribution of an
improvement in CIM to investment and, indirectly, to growth; what would have
been the effects on rate of investment and education enrollment and, indirectly, on
per capita GDP if Argentina’s CIM would have been equivalent to the average of
Australia’s and Canada’s?26
The result of this counterfactual exercise indicates that, ceteris paribus, a higher
CIM would have led to a higher rate of physical and human capital accumulation
(Table 3). The simultaneous rise of the enrollment and investment rates would have
increased the pace of economic growth and, thus, reduced the gap in per capita GDP
with Australia and Canada (Table 4). Actually, had Argentina reached a CIM
similar to the average of Australia’s and Canada’s, she would have kept pace with
Australia until 1960 (Fig. 5a), and though her decline with respect to Canada would
have begun in 1940, a substantial deterioration would have not occurred until the
1960s (Fig. 5b).
In this counterfactual scenario, however, even if the investment rate and GDP
had been higher (Tables 3, 4), a widening gap in per capita income with regard to
Australia and Canada would have appeared since the 1960s (Fig. 5a, b). This means
that, at least within the framework of our static and partial equilibrium
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Fig. 4 Argentina’s relative CIM, 1863–2002 (differences in logs)
26 Note, however, that, as Clague et al. (1999, p. 197) remind us, ‘‘cross-country variation in CIM may be
idiosyncratic’’.
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counterfactual exercise, Argentina’s lower CIM does not explain the differences in
GDP per head with respect to Australia and Canada during the last four decades of
the twentieth century (although, perhaps, in a dynamic general equilibrium
framework the results would be more satisfactory). It is true that high inflation
weakens significantly CIM as a measure of contract enforcement and security of
property during the second half of the twentieth century and, especially, during the
hyperinflation years (1971–1991). However, the fact is that other variables such
total factor productivity (TFP), perceived as a major determinant of differentials in
performance across countries (Prescott 1998), are hardly discussed in the
Argentinean literature and, hence, not contemplated here.27 Evidence on TFP for
Argentina shows a slowdown after 1950 that deepened since the mid-1970s. Thus,
TFP growth fell from 2.7% per year in the 1940s to 1% in the 1950s and was cut
further down to 0.6% in the 1960s (Elı´as 1978, p. 369). Then, it became negative in
the 1970s (-0.3%) and collapsed in the 1980s (-2.1%) to recover only in the 1990s
(Kydland and Zarazaga 2002, p. 156).
To sum up, the view that Argentina’s long-run decline has deep institutional roots
is supported by the evidence provided here. Better contract enforcement and
definition of property rights would have promoted broad capital accumulation and,
thus, allowed Argentina to keep pace with Australia and Canada until the second
Table 4 Argentina’s relative per capita GDP: actual and counterfactual values (%)
Australia (100) Canada (100)
Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual
1875–1891 40 44 74 80
1892–1921 80 84 90 91
1922–1960 77 86 79 86
1961–1979 69 72 64 67
1980–2000 51 58 46 52
Table 3 Broad capital in Argentina: actual and counterfactual values (%)
Investment (% GDP) Enrollment rate (%)
Actual Counterfactual (CIM as in) Actual Counterfactual (CIM as in)
Australia Canada Australia Canada
1875–1891 11.4 13.8 12.6 14.4 16.0 15.3
1892–1921 9.4 13.7 11.7 27.0 32.6 30.8
1922–1960 12.2 19.4 17.4 44.5 49.1 47.8
1961–1979 27.1 39.9 36.9 60.5 72.6 71.2
1980–2000 18.9 31.4 30.7 79.2 90.8 91.0
27 In fact, Clague et al. (1999, p. 201–202) noticed that most of the impact of CIM is through investment
and not through efficiency gains.
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half of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, and at odds with the historical literature,
capital accumulation does not seem to suffice for Argentina to maintain its position
relative to other countries of new settlement since the 1960s. Her deepening
divergence in the late twentieth century seems attributable to a slowdown in TFP
growth. The extent to which poor efficiency gains resulted from low quality
institutions deserves further research.
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Fig. 5 a Actual and counterfactual Argentina’s per capita GDP relative to Australia, 1875–2000
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Appendix
1 Econometric testing of CIM as measure of contract enforcement
What does CIM depend on? Is it really an institutional indicator? In order to provide
a formal answer we have carried out a cointegration analysis between CIM and the
variables representing economic freedom (RIEF)—a variable constructed through
the principal component analysis, institutional instability—proxied it by the length
of tenure of Supreme Court justices (Iaryczower et al. 2002) (Supreme),28 income
distribution, proxied by the ratio between GDP per worker and the unskilled wage
(Prados de la Escosura 2007)29 (INEQ), and financial development defined as the
ratio of money supply (M2) to GDP (DEPTH). Our quantitative exercise confirms
the institutional nature of CIM (Figs. 6, 7, 8, 9).
The objective is to find a stable relationship in the long-run between CIM and each
of these variables which will permit us to test for causality, that is, the direction in
which those variables are influencing each other. To do so and due to the fact that all
these variables are integrated of order one [I(1)], as can be seen in Table 5, we are able
to contrast the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration relation between CIM and
each of these two variables. The results obtained are presented in Tables 5 and 6.30
The fact that a cointegration relationship has been found means that each of these
variables has a common trend with CIM and, hence, a stable short-run relationship
can be inferred which leads us to develop a Granger causality test between CIM and
the rest of the variables. The results presented in Table 6 suggest that RIEF,
DEPTH, Supreme, and INEQ are individually causing CIM. Thus, we can conclude
that CIM may be consider as a variable that summarizes, and is caused by, variables
such as economic freedom, institutional stability, income distribution, and financial
development.
In order to explore the kind of association established between CIM and the rest
of variables we can now proceed with a cointegration analysis to test the existence
28 Iaryczower et al. (2002) and Alston and Gallo (2003, 2006) support the use of this indicator as a
measure of political instability.
29 The rationale for the index is that while the numerator captures returns to all factors of production per
worked hour. This inequality index was introduced by Williamson (1997).
30 Due to space problems we do not present the entirely results here but you can see them in Prados de la
Escosura and Sanz-Villarroya (2006).the denominator only encapsulates returns for raw labor, the factor
whose ownership is more widespread.
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of a long-run relationship between CIM, as the dependent variable, and RIEF,
DEPTH, Supreme, and INEQ as the explanatory variables so CIM is modelled as an
endogenous variable.31
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Fig. 6 CIM and RIEF, 1875–2003 (normalized)
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Fig. 7 CIM and financial depth, 1875–2000 (normalized)
31 Instead of using extensions of the Gregory and Hansen method for the case of multiple breaks, which
would induce us to search for the breaks in an endogenous way again (Bai and Perron 1998) we have
accepted the breaks based upon the previous analysis of the individual relationship between CIM and its
explanatory variables. Nevertheless, we have chosen the combination of breaks that reports the best
adjustment in the model based on the F-statistic and on the AIC selection criteria.
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The results shown in Table 7 confirm the existence of a cointegration relationship
between this set of variables which are the fundamental determinants of CIM’s
long-run behavior. Furthermore, the sign of this correlation changes from mid-
twentieth century onwards as the cointegration shifted to a new long-run
relationship. A change of regime occurred since 1960 in the long-run relationship
between RIEF and CIM and, henceforth, RIEF exhibited a slightly negative
relationship with CIM. Thus, a 10% increase in RIEF would raise CIM by 0.9%
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CIM INEQ
Fig. 9 Evolution of CIM and inequality (INEQ), 1875–2000 (normalized)
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Fig. 8 CIM and the Supreme Court Justices’ length of tenure (Supreme), 1875–2000 (normalized)
Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina’s long-run decline 19
123
before 1960 while, thereafter, a similar increase would reduce CIM by 0.2%. A
similar finding is found from 1942 onwards for the long-run relationship between
CIM and Supreme. It can be shown, then, that a 10% increase in Supreme rises CIM
by 0.6% upto 1942, while reduces it by 0.2% thereafter. A positive association is
found between both DEPTH and INEQ, and CIM. Thus, a 10% rise in DEPTH
would increase CIM by 1.3%, while a similar increase in INEQ leads to a 0.8%
increment in CIM. So, it seems that since 1960 the financial development, DEPTH,
and income distribution, INEQ, variables became the main determinants of the
positive trend observed in CIM up to the end of the twentieth century, offsetting the
decline in economic freedom, RIEF, and in institutional stability, Supreme.32 Why
income inequality is positively associated to contract enforcement poses? a most
challenging question. Is it because since natural resources were the abundant factor
Table 6 Individual Granger causality test between CIM and the other variables
CIM /? RIEF CIM /? DEPTH
RIEF ? CIM DEPTH ? CIM
CIM /? SUPREME CIM /? INEQ
SUPREME ? CIM INEQ ? CIM
/? means there is no causality in this direction,? means there is a significative causality in this direction
Table 5 Individual cointegration models
CIM RIEF DEPTH SUPREME INEQ
Break intercepta 1960 (negative) 1946 (negative) – –
Break regime 1960 (negative) – 1942 (negative) –
ADF test -6,112b -3,735b -4,585b –
The Augmented Dickey–Fuller test (ADF) applied to the residuals from the cointegration relation shown
below does not permit us to reject the null hypothesis because the value obtained is smaller than the
critical value at 1% significance
a We allow for the existence of a break in the cointegration relation between every pair of variables.
Following Gregory-Hansen (2003), if the model is indeed cointegrated with a one-time regime shift in the
cointegrating vector, the standard ADF test may not reject the null hypothesis and one could wrongly
conclude that there is no long-run relationship. If this is our case, we should be able to find, in a endogenous
way, the break which exhibits the minimum value, the maximum value in absolute terms, in an ADF test
applied to the residuals from the cointegration relation which contains this particular break. We have to
treat the timing of this shift as unknown.The structural change would be reflected in changes in the
intercept, regime, and/or in the slope. We have chosen the combination of breaks that reports the best
adjustment in the model based on the F-statistic and on the AIC selection criteria (Bai and Perron 1998)
b Rejection at 1% significance
32 The tests applied to the long-run relationship between CIM, RIEF, and DEPTH indicates that the
determinants of CIM are not redundant as both RIEF and DEPTH have their own particular explanatory
power. We are not able to reject the hypothesis that sustains that the errors in the model are homocedastic
and independent. Hence, we do not have heteroscedasticity problems and the RESERT test shows that
there is no linearity in the parameters and, thus, the linear specification we have proposed appears to be
correct.
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Table 7 Long-run relationship
Dependent: LCIM Parameters
Constant -13.185 (-15.055)
Time 0.006 (14.814)
LRIEF 0.091 (3.799)
LDEPTH 0.129 (5.128)
LSUPREME 0.062 (4.289)
LINEQ 0.084 (2.733)
DU50 -0.165 (-5.824)
(DU60 9 RIEF) -0.113 (-4.391)
(DU42 9 LSUPREME) -0.086 (-7.456)
R2-adjacent = 0.846, AIC = -5.709, F = 80.471, No. of observations = 116
t ratios in brackets, L the variable expressed in logarithms, DU50 dummy variable that represents a
change in the level of the long-run relationship after 1950, DU60 and DU42 are dummy variables that
represent a change in the relationship of RIEF and SUPREME with CIM, after 1960 and 1942,
respectively
Test ADF over the residuals of the model:
Model C, -6.245*; Model C/T, -6.221*; Model (none), -6.272*
Test redundant variables (RIEF/LDEPTH):
Ho, the coefficients of the two variables are jointly zero; F = 103.04 (critical value = 4.79); Log
LR = 122.44 (critical value = 10.60)
Test de White:
Ho, errors are homoscedastic and independents; White test = 12.73 (critical value = 16.7)
RESERT test:
Ho, linear functional form; F = 0.241 (0.63); Log LR = 0.256
Table 8 Error correction model
Dependent: DCIM
et-1 -0.219 (-3.950)
DRIEF (-2) 0.021 (1.849)
DDEPTH 0.199 (8.707)
DDEPTH (-1) -0.099 (-4.200)
DSUPREME -0.015 (-2.207)
DSUPREME (-2) 0.012 (1.807)
DLINEQ 0.100 (3.797)
SEPARATION 0.008 (1.876)
R2-adjacent = 0.496, AIC = -4.070, F-st. = 16.750, DW = 1.987, No. of observations = 113
D the variables in differences, et-1 the lagged error term of the cointegration equation (Table 7) and is the
variable that represents the adjustment in the long-run
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in Argentina, openness, associate to growth is, in a Stolper-Samuelson way, also
related to inequality?33
Together with this long-run association we can also derive a short-run
relationship, via the error correction model associated with the cointegration
relationship. Our results (Table 8) confirm the idea that the variation in CIM is
influenced by deviation (in the previous period) from long-run equilibrium,
represented by the parameter et-1.
Moreover, in the short-run, CIM depends on the recent and past variations in
RIEF, DEPTH, Supreme, and INEQ. More specifically, the variation of CIM in a
particular year would be higher, the larger the change in economic freedom (RIEF)
(2 years before), in financial development (DEPTH), in Supreme (2 years before)
and the separation of powers variable (Separation).34 Additionally, an increase in
income inequality (INEQ), leads to a rise in CIM. Conversely, an increase in both
Supreme and in DEPTH (a year before) leads to a reduction in the variation of CIM.
Thus, in the long-run CIM depends on RIEF, DEPTH, Supreme, and INEQ, a
relationship that it is also stable in the short run.
2 Sources
Argentina
Black Market (official-market exchange rate deviation, in logs), 1913–1984,
IEERAL (1986); since 1985, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) data appendix.
Consumption, total and government (ratio to GDP), Della Paolera et al. (2003).
Contract intensive money (CIM) [(M2-C)/M2], 1863–1891, Corte´s Conde
(1998a); 1892–1948, Della Paolera et al. (2003); since 1948, IMF (2003). Adjusted
to IMF levels of M2 and C (currency in circulation).
Dependency rate (percentage of population below 15 and above 64 over
population ages 15–64), 1875–1900, Mitchell (1995); since 1900, Astorga et al.
(2003).
Depreciation in the real value of money (inflation rate/(100 + inflation rate),
Della Paolera et al. (2003).
Economically active population, 1875–1900, Mitchell (1995); since 1900,
Astorga et al. (2003).
Financial depth (ratio of money supply, M2 to GDP), M2 as for CIM; GDP at
current prices, Della Paolera et al.(2003).
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), at current prices, Della Paolera et al. (2003); at
constant prices, 1875–1935, Corte´s Conde (1997); since 1935, Maddison (2003).
Interest rate (1875–1893, returns to public bonds; 1913–1933, banking discount
rate), 1875–1930, Della Paolera (1994); 1930–1950, Della Paolera y Ortiz (1995);
33 Could it be argued that Argentina represents the scenario in which individual savings rates rise with
per capita income and, hence, a rise in income inequality increases investment and, thus, growth? As
Barro (2000, p.8) points, this hypothesis implies a relatively closed economy to the extent the investment
rate is closely related to the savings rate, as it seems to have been the Argentinean case.
34 Separation is a dummy variable that takes value one when there is separation between legislative,
executive, and judicial powers and has been computed from Alston and Gallo (2003, Fig. 4).
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1950–1973, Vitelli (1990); since 1973, IMF (2003). Real interest rate obtained by
adjusting the nominal interest rate by inflation.
INEQ, real income inequality (ratio of real GDP per EAP to real wage rates), real
GDP and EAP from the sources quoted above. Real wages from Williamson (1995,
updated) and International Labor Office (various years).
Investment rate (investment ratio to GDP), Della Paolera et al. (2003).
Openness (exports ratio to GDP), Della Paolera et al. (2003); since 1985, IMF
(2003).
Population, 1875–1900, Mitchell (1995); since 1900, Astorga et al. (2003).
Primary and secondary enrollment (proportion of population ages 5–18 in
primary and secondary school), Mitchell (1995); since 1900, Astorga et al. (2003).
Reduced index of economic freedom’ (RIEF), is an index whose components are
public consumption (Gi) as a proportion of total consumption [Gi/(Gi + Ci)], the
‘depreciation in the real value of money’ (inflation rate/100 + inflation rate),
weighted nominal protection (tariff), and the difference (in logs) between the
official exchange rate and the market rate (‘black market’). The index is derived
through the PCA method.
Relative price of capital goods (the investment deflator ratio to the consumption
deflator, in logs), Della Paolera et al. (2003).
Separation of powers, a dummy variable that takes value one when there is
separation between legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and 0 otherwise,
computed from Alston and Gallo (2003), Fig. 4.
Supreme Court justices’ length of tenure, number of years, kindly supplied by
Pablo Spiller.
Tariff (nominal weighted tariff, i.e., ratio of tariff revenues to imports’ values),
Della Paolera et al. (2003); since 1985, IMF (2003).
Terms of trade (ratio of export price to import price), Williamson (private
communication), 1870–1913; Della Paolera et al. (2003), 1913–1984, since 1984,
IMF (2003).
DU45 dummy with values before 1945, 0; otherwise 1. DU507 dummy with
values before 1950, 0; 1 otherwise. DU60 dummy with values before 1960, 0; 1
otherwise.
Australia
Contract intensive money (CIM) [(M2-C)/M2], 1863–1948, Vamplew (1987); since
1948, IMF (2003). Adjusted to IMF levels of M2 and C (currency in circulation).
Investment rate (investment ratio to GDP), Vamplew (1987); since 1970, OECD
(2004).
Canada
Contract intensive money (CIM) [(M2-C)/M2], 1863–1948, Statistics Canada
(2004); since 1948, IMF (2003). Adjusted to IMF levels of M2 and C (currency in
circulation).
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Investment rate (investment ratio to GDP), 1870–1926, Urquhart (1986); 1926–
1970, statistics Canada (2004); since 1970, OECD (2004).
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